ABSTRACT: Employer-financed health insurance systems, like that used in the United States, distort firms’ labor demand and adversely affect the economy. Since such costs vary with employment rather than hours worked, firms have an incentive to increase output by increasing worker hours rather than employment. Given that the returns to employment exceed the returns to hours worked, this results in lower levels of employment and output. In this paper we construct a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model where individuals differ with respect to their productivity and employment opportunities. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, we generate steady state results for two models; one in which health insurance is financed primarily through employer contributions that vary with employment, and a second where insurance is funded through a non-distortionary, lump-sum tax. This allows us to estimate the effect of employer-based health insurance on output, employment, hours worked and inequality.

ABSTRACT: Employer-financed health insurance systems, like that used in the United States, distort firms’ labor demand and adversely affect the economy. Since such costs vary with employment rather than hours worked, firms have an incentive to increase output by increasing worker hours rather than employment. Given that the returns to employment exceed the returns to hours worked, this results in lower levels of employment and output. In this paper we construct a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model where individuals differ with respect to their productivity and employment opportunities. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, we generate steady state results for two models; one in which health insurance is financed primarily through employer contributions that vary with employment, and a second where insurance is funded through a non-distortionary, lump-sum tax. This allows us to estimate the effect of employer-based health insurance on output, employment, hours worked and inequality.

ABSTRACT: College football programs devote an enormous amount of resources in efforts to persuade high school football players to attend their schools. In this study, we develop an empirical model of the factors that recruits consider when selecting a school, using a database that combines school-specific attributes with recruit-specific information. Our estimates imply that recruits’ decisions are governed by a handful of primary factors such as the geographical distance between the recruit and the college, the school’s recent football rankings and whether the school is a member of one of the six BCS conferences.

ABSTRACT: College football programs devote an enormous amount of resources in efforts to persuade high school football players to attend their schools. In this study, we develop an empirical model of the factors that recruits consider when selecting a school, using a database that combines school-specific attributes with recruit-specific information. Our estimates imply that recruits’ decisions are governed by a handful of primary factors such as the geographical distance between the recruit and the college, the school’s recent football rankings and whether the school is a member of one of the six BCS conferences.

Interested in becoming an Economics major or joining the Econ Club? You are welcome too! – Come join us from 5:30-7:00pm at the Country Club Lanes. Bowling, shoe rentals and snacks will be provided complimentary by the Econ Club.